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INTRODUCTION
Reducing Emission from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation (REDD+) is a payment for
ecosystem services (PES) system created under
the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC) that tries to reduce
deforestation and degradation in countries not
subject to requirements under the convention
(non-Annex 1 countries) and, therefore, release
less and sequester more carbon. Other co-
benefits have been added, such as biodiversity
protection, poverty reduction and afforestation,
which make up the ‘+’ in REDD+. The ‘+’,
therefore, attempts to address potentially
negative, unintended effects on non-carbon
ecosystem services and take account of effects
on those who currently have claims to forests.
Many of the forest areas where the ‘+’ is most
important are community managed.
Community forestry is therefore at the heart of
REDD+.
Fundamentally, REDD+ is about creating
markets for carbon sequestration services where
REDD+ buyers are in FCCC Annex 1 countries
and sellers remain in non-Annex 1 countries.
These markets, which presumably will be linked
to other created carbon markets, are believed to
be necessary because of the common pool nature
of carbon sequestration services.  Services from
common pool resources are depletable and
difficult to defend from intrusion and/or
depletion.  For example, carbon sequestration
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services can easily be reduced by slash-and-burn
agriculture.  Furthermore, once carbon is
sequestered, in principle, everyone on earth who
cares about climate stability also immediately
gets access to those benefits.  Access to carbon
sequestration as a form of ecosystem services is,
therefore, open and potentially impossible to
defend.
These common pool features of carbon
sequestration services imply that it is difficult
for businesses to earn profits (except perhaps as
government or multilateral agency contractors)
by providing them.  Businesses, therefore,
generally do not provide services like carbon
sequestration (or for that matter, most other
ecosystem services), which means that without
government help there are no carbon markets,
no carbon prices and potentially no carbon
value.
The lack of carbon prices due to missing markets
is believed to be particularly problematic.  When
prices are absent for something, some people
may perceive the price as zero, which can be
interpreted as meaning carbon sequestration
services are not at all scarce and therefore a)
there is no reason to provide them and b) we
should use forests for other purposes1. This
problem of not having market prices for many
services is inherent in the management of all
common pool resources.   Such issues are
1 This set of conclusions emerges from models of behaviour that presume that people primarily operate in their self-interest and are
unwilling to sacrifice in meaningful ways for the greater good. This assumption certainly has limits.  Indeed, without tendencies for
cooperation, humans would probably long ago have completely degraded most ecosystems that have commercial value.  Nevertheless,
it is reasonable to suppose that self-interest plays a very important role in human behaviour.
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especially complicated in developing country
forests because they provide a variety of
sometimes conflicting common pool resource
ecosystem services.
Developing appropriate REDD+ carbon
markets is a potentially important tool to give
value to forest ecosystem services.  In the process,
once valued properly, the hope is that REDD+
will create incentives for those who control
forests to sequester carbon and for those who
emit carbon into the atmosphere to pay for
sequestration services. But what would cause
such transactions to take place?  Following the
logic presented above, sequestering carbon must
be in the interest of those who control forests
and those who emit carbon.  That is, both sides
must benefit financially or in other key
dimensions for REDD+ to work.
A particularly influential report was published
by the consulting firm McKinsey and Company
(2010).  This paper ranked costs to reduce
THE IMPORTANCE OF
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
From the community managed forest
perspective, the basic economics has everything
to do with carbon prices and the opportunity
costs of carbon sequestration (i.e. what
communities and community members give up
to sequester carbon).  As long as carbon buyers
offer benefits to communities that are more than
communities’ costs of providing carbon
sequestration services, our basic behavioural
model suggests that it will be in the interest of
communities to sequester carbon. There must
also be a match from the carbon buyer
perspective.  Carbon sequestration in non-
Annex 1 countries must, therefore, be perceived
as relatively ‘cheap’ compared with other
potential abatement options, such as fuel
switching and installation of energy efficiency,
among others.
Figure 1: Costs to reduce carbon concentrations in the atmosphere
Source: McKinsey and Company (2010)
carbon concentrations in the atmosphere per
ton of carbon reduced. One of the findings of
the report, as summarized in Figure 1, is that
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carbon benefits from land improvements, such
as degraded land restoration, reduced slash and
burn agriculture and better forest management,
could be achieved at a very low cost. For example,
they estimate that reduced forest degradation,
in addition to providing potentially significant
co-benefits, could reduce carbon at less than   10
per ton.  Similar results were also found using
simulation techniques by Kindermann et al.
(2008) and Strassburg et al. (2009), estimate that
80% of avoided deforestation costs less than
US$5.00 per ton of Carbon Dioxide (CO
2
).
Though controversy remains regarding whether
all local opportunity costs of carbon
sequestration were effectively included (Dyer
and Counsel 2010; Gregorsen et al. 2011), such
results suggest that forests may be able to
effectively compete with other methods to
reduce carbon in the atmosphere.
POTENTIAL LINKS BETWEEN
REDD+ AND COMMUNITY
MANAGED FORESTS
The findings of the above-stated studies
generated a lot of interest because it is believed
that deforestation and forest degradation are
major sources of carbon emissions.  Loss of forest
biomass through deforestation and forest
degradation accounts for 12–20 per cent of
annual greenhouse gas emissions (Saatchi et al.
2011; van der Werf et al. 2009). UNEP (2012)
estimates a smaller, though still significant,
share at 11 per cent.  In the 1990s, it was
estimated that deforestation, largely in the
developing world, released about 5.8 gigatons of
CO
2
 per year, which was more than all forms of
transport combined.  Total carbon stored in
forests is estimated at 638 gigatons CO
2
(UNFCCC 2011), with about 247 gigatons
stored in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa
and Southeast Asia.  About 80 per cent of total
sequestered carbon accounts to above ground
(Saatchi et al. 2011).
Community managed forests could be a
potentially important player because while most
forests in developing countries are government-
owned in papers, in practice much of this forest
is actually controlled, to an important degree,
by the communities (Agrawal et al. 2008).  About
25 per cent of developing country forests, or
three times as much as is owned by the private
sector, is under community ownership and/or
administration and this percentage appears to
be increasing over time.  During the period
1997–2008, the area of collective ownership
roughly doubled to 250 million hectares (World
Bank 2009). Given the importance of
community managed forests and the recent
increases observed, it is difficult to envision a
successful REDD+ without coming to terms
with community managed forests.
And the use of forest biomass extracted from
community managed forests also appears to be
very important for climate change.  Over two
billion people around the world cook and heat
with biomass on a regular basis, and most of this
comes from community managed forests.
Though fuelwood is in principle carbon neutral,
the black carbon from biomass fuels for cooking
and heating, particularly in Asia, is believed to
be a key contributor to climate change.  CO
2
emissions cause about 40 per cent of
anthropogenic climate change, but black carbon
comes in second with perhaps as much as a 30
per cent contribution (Rosenthal 2009; Bond
et al. 2013).   Bond et al. (2013) find that 25 per
cent of black carbon emissions come from
residential cooking and heating, mostly in the
developing world.  Smith et al. (2000) find that,
depending on the timeline examined, the global
warming contribution of a meal cooked using
biomass can be significantly higher than those
for fossil fuels.
KEY CAUTIONS IN MOVING
AHEAD WITH REDD+
The potential for REDD+ applied to
community managed forests to contribute to
climate change mitigation appears significant,
but we must also ask what could be on the way
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of incentives for REDD+ transactions.  An
obvious point that applies not only to
community managed forests or even to carbon
sequestration is that at the present time, a very
small percentage of firms in FCCC Annex 1
countries face binding limits on their carbon
emissions.  Except for voluntary motivations,
including those related to altruism, public
relations and hedging against future regulations,
such firms have very limited incentives to
purchase carbon sequestration credits.  To make
REDD+ markets work, economic actors that
emit carbon in the developed world must,
therefore, be subjected to binding caps.
Because Annex 1 country emitters typically do
not have binding caps, private transactions are
very limited.  The crafters of REDD+, as
discussed in Angelsen (2008), envisioned
multiple types of REDD+ finance, with
development assistance being one that is an
‘order of magnitude’ less than market finance
(pp. 60, 110).  In practice, as of 2013, REDD+
appears to be moving towards a fund-based
institutional structure that some say is more like
foreign aid than a true PES scheme.  Such a
trend has generated serious concerns about the
‘aid-ification’ of REDD+ (Evans 2012).
The second major reason why REDD may not
work as hoped in community forest contexts is
that costs may prove higher than expected and
bargains cannot be reached.  Costs associated
with community negotiations, meetings,
monitoring, risk aversion and high discount
rates (Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009;2013) could
turn out to be significant and potentially make
communities unwilling to participate in
REDD+ at prices carbon buyers would be
willing to pay.  This would, of course, imply that
carbon sequestration from community managed
forests would be too costly for Annex 1 buyers.
Particularly if hidden costs turn out to be very
high, there may be risks that REDD+ could
distort or destabilize well-functioning
community managed forests.  This very issue
was examined by Elinor Ostrom and a variety of
collaborators in the context of irrigation
systems.  As discussed in detail in Ostrom
(1990), Ostrom and Gardner (1993) and
Ostrom (2000; 2009), social systems supporting
irrigation systems, like those related to
community managed forests, are typically
complicated, with very detailed rules and norms.
These systems can be, and have been,
destabilized by outside attempts to improve the
efficiency of irrigation through, for example,
construction of permanent headworks. Such
steps have sometimes reduced incentives for
reciprocity among farmers at the head and tail
of irrigation systems, destabilizing social systems
that were working reasonably well (Ostrom and
Gardner 1993).
Third, while it is widely agreed that REDD+
should not impose excessive constraints on local
processes or, much worse, forcibly take away
existing community rights, these issues will
remain as serious concerns.  Bushley and Khatri
(2011), Ostrom (2010) and Agrawal et al.
(2011), all suggest that a core challenge is to
create appropriate institutions for channelling
REDD+ benefits and imposing costs on those
who control community managed forests. All
three authors note that critical inputs for
getting institutions right are collaborative design
processes between all levels of REDD+ actors
(e.g. international, national and local),
recognition of local rights and commitments to
locally-tailored solutions.
A key overarching mechanism design issue,
therefore, is how REDD+ benefits can
effectively be transferred to the local level and
additional costs apportioned without disrupting
successful community management systems.
Taking into account the seven design principles
proposed in Ostrom (1990) and expanded in
Ostrom (2009) and elsewhere, we know that
group membership, benefit-sharing rules,
fairness, public participation and social
sanctioning are very important.  Any REDD+
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flows would likely raise the stakes associated
with proper institutional design.  If REDD+ is
to go fo rward successfully, the structure of
REDD+ funding mechanisms will, therefore,
have to be closely linked with community
management institutional structures.
There are a variety of issues particularly tied to
the use of fund-based finance mechanisms
(Bluffstone et al. 2013).  First, such an approach
probably cannot provide enough funding to meet
developing country needs or to effectively exploit
community managed forest carbon sequestration
opportunities.  Second, under such systems,
governments hardly receive any REDD+
payments (Humphreys 2008) and will be
monopsony2 buyers of carbon.   Implicit in this
approach is that government owns the carbon
stock, gets the carbon rents and chooses to what
extent and how to compensate villagers for lost
access to forest resources. There is, therefore, a
possibly legitimate concern that governments
could set exploitative prices and terms.  From
their side, communities may view these terms
as government requirements over which they
have few bargaining rights.
There is also a tendency in the literature to think
in terms of estimating opportunity costs and
extracting carbon rents from local communities
in order to purchase the most carbon possible
with donor budgets (Gregorsen et al. 2011;
Bakkegaard et al. 2012).  Such approaches are
not in harmony with free bargaining or
community property rights and mechanisms
should be developed that allow communities to
earn rents as occurs in a variety of other
circumstances.   On the positive side, donors
often are very supportive of approaches that
involve local communities. A central role for
donors may, therefore, protect communities
when appropriate.
Very limited rigorous empirical research on
REDD+ has been conducted within the context
of community managed forests and I am aware
of no economic analysis of compensation
mechanisms and governance complexities
associated with REDD+.  To date, such issues
have merely been raised by researchers and
advocates as I am doing now. As I have tried to
emphasize, the literature on social capital and
community managed forests point to important
cautions that should be respected and suggest a
variety of practical details that must be addressed.
These huge gaps in the economics literature
must be at least partially closed before moving
ahead with REDD+.
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